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POINTWISE DEFINABLE MODELS OF SET THEORY
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, DAVID LINETSKY, AND JONAS REITZ
Abstract. A pointwise definable model is one in which every ob-
ject is definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this
property strengthens V = HOD, but is not first-order expressible.
Nevertheless, if ZFC is consistent, then there are continuum many
pointwise definable models of ZFC. If there is a transitive model of
ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive
models of ZFC. What is more, every countable model of ZFC has a
class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. Indeed, for the
main contribution of this article, every countable model of Go¨del-
Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which
every set and class is first-order definable without parameters.
1. Introduction by way of a curious logic conundrum
One occasionally hears the argument—let us call it the math-tea
argument, for perhaps it is heard at a good math tea—that there must
be real numbers that we cannot describe or define, because there are are
only countably many definitions, but uncountably many reals. Does it
withstand scrutiny?1
We can be precise, of course, and define that an element a of a
structure M is definable (without parameters) when there is a formula
ϕ(x) in the language of M such that M |= ϕ[x] only at x = a. In the
continuum of the ordered real line 〈R, <〉, for example, there are no
definable elements, since the automorphism group acts transitively by
translation and all points look alike. With the ordered field structure
〈R,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, however, every algebraic number becomes definable,
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1See [Ani] for an instance of the argument at MathOverflow, which surely serves
a brisk cup of math tea online. We leave aside the remark of Horatio, eight-year-old
son of the first author, who announced, “Sure, papa, I can describe any number.
Let me show you: tell me any number, and I’ll tell you a description of it!”
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but only these, by Tarski’s theorem on real closed fields. As one adds
additional structure 〈R,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Z, sin(x), ex, · · · 〉, the collection of
definable reals grows larger. Eventually, we will in our definitions be
attracted to the possibilities of using higher order mathematical objects
and constructions, such as function classes, spaces or measures, and this
amounts to defining objects in increasingly large fragments Vα of the
set-theoretic universe. Most all of the classical mathematical structure
is itself definable in the set-theoretic structure 〈Vω+ω,∈〉, a model of
the Zermelo axioms, and so the definable reals of this structure includes
almost every real ever defined classically. The structures arising with
larger ordinals, however, allow us to define even more reals.
It would be a kind of cheating, for the problem at hand, to define
a real r or other object by using a language or structure that was
itself otherwise undefinable or uncanonical, such as by using a constant
symbol with value r or a unary predicate satisfied only at r; this would
be like defining π as “the value of the constant symbol π,” which is
surely unsatisfying. Similarly, we do not want to offer a definition of r
in some enormous 〈Vα,∈〉 when α is not itself somehow definable, since
in effect this is using α as a kind of parameter. Rather, the spirit of the
problem seems to be to define reals using only structure that is itself
definable in the set-theoretic background. This amounts, of course,
simply to defining the real directly with respect to the set-theoretic
background 〈V,∈〉 in the first place.
In any fixed structure M in a countable language, including the
higher-order set-theoretic structures 〈Vα,∈〉, the math-tea argument
seems fine: since there are only countably many definitions to use, but
uncountably many reals, there will indeed be many reals that are not
definable there.
But when we make the move as we have discussed to defining reals
or other objects with respect to the set-theoretic background 〈V,∈〉, a
subtle meta-mathematical obstacle arises for the math-tea argument.
Specifically, in order to count the definable objects, the argument pre-
sumes that we have a way of associating to each definable object a
definition of it, a definability map r 7→ ψ, where r is the unique object
satisfying ψ(r). This is not a problem when we are working with def-
initions over a set structure, since the satisfaction relation over a set
structure is definable from that structure, but it becomes problematic
with definitions over V , for reasons connected with Tarski’s theorem on
the non-definability of truth. Basically, there is no uniform first-order
way to express the concept “x is defined by formula ψ” within set the-
ory. This obstacle for the math-tea argument suggests a possibility
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that perhaps one could live in a model of ZFC in which every real is
definable without parameters.
Question 1. Is it consistent with the axioms of set theory that every
real is definable in the language of set theory without parameters?
The answer is Yes. Indeed, much more is true: if the ZFC axioms
of set theory are consistent, then there are models of ZFC in which
every object, including every real number, every function on the reals,
every set of reals, every topological space, every ordinal and so on,
is uniquely definable without parameters. Inside such a universe, the
math-tea argument comes ultimately to a false conclusion.
Definition 2. A first-order structure M is pointwise definable if every
element of M is definable in M without parameters.
In a pointwise definable model, every object can be specified as the
unique object with some first-order property. In such models, all ob-
jects are discernible; every object satisfies a unique principal complete
1-type. Notice that the property of being pointwise definable is not
first-order expressible, since it is not preserved by elementary exten-
sions. Clearly, pointwise definable models in a countable language must
be countable, since there are only countably many definitions.
Theorem 3.
(1) If ZFC is consistent, then there are continuum many non-
isomorphic pointwise definable models of ZFC.
(2) If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there are continuum
many transitive pointwise-definable models of ZFC.
(3) Every countable model of ZFC has a class forcing extension that
is pointwise definable.
(4) Every countable model of GBC has a pointwise definable exten-
sion, in which every set and class is first-order definable without
parameters.
The first two claims have fairly soft proofs and might be consid-
ered to be a part of the mathematical folklore. Statement (1) could
be credited to Myhill [Myh52]. The latter two claims are more sub-
stantial forcing arguments. Statement (3) is mentioned independently
in [Ena05] and, in the case of countable transitive models, in [Dav82].
Our main contribution is statement (4), which implies the earlier state-
ments. The rest of this article is devoted to proving these facts and
several other related results we find interesting. We begin in section 2
with some elementary observations about pointwise definable models
of set theory and prove the easier initial results. In sections 3 and 4,
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we move into the forcing arguments, relying on work of Simpson in the
case of ZFC and a result of S. Friedman, building on a result of Kossak
and Schmerl from PA, for the fully general GBC case.
2. Pointwise Definable Models of ZFC
The first task is to establish the basic fact that pointwise definable
models of set theory do indeed exist.
Theorem 4. If there is a model of ZFC, then there is a pointwise defin-
able model of ZFC. Indeed, there are continuum many non-isomorphic
such models.
Proof. If there is a model of ZFC, then there is a model M |= ZFC +
V = HOD. Such a model has a parameter-free definable well-ordering
of the universe, and therefore it has parameter-free definable Skolem
functions, which simply select the least witness with respect to the
definable well-ordering. If M0 is the collection of all definable elements
ofM , then it is closed under these definable Skolem functions and thus
M0 ≺ M . From this, it follows that definitions work the same in M0
as in M , and so every object of M0 is definable in M0. Thus, M0 is a
pointwise definable model of ZFC. By the Go¨del-Rosser theorem, there
are continuum many consistent completions of ZFC + V = HOD, and
we have established that each such theory has a pointwise definable
model. 
Myhill [Myh52] was evidently the first to observe (in contemporary
language) that if ZFC is consistent, then there is a pointwise definable
model of GBC + V = L, by essentially the argument we have given,
using the definable Skolem functions of L. Indeed, Myhill was fully
aware of the implications for the math-tea argument, for he concludes
his otherwise terse article with:
One often hears it said that since there are indenu-
merably many sets and only denumerably many names,
therefore there must be nameless sets. The above shows
this argument to be fallacious.
The fact is that every pointwise definable model of ZFC arises in
exactly the manner of the proof of theorem 4. A prime model is one
that embeds elementarily into every model of its theory.
Observation 5. The following are equivalent:
(1) M is a pointwise definable model of ZFC.
(2) M consists of the definable elements, without parameters, of a
model of ZFC + V = HOD.
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(3) M is a prime model of ZFC + V = HOD.
Proof. The first statement implies the second since every pointwise-
definable model satisfies V = HOD, and the converse implication is
the proof of theorem 4. These models are exactly the prime models
of ZFC + V = HOD, since the theory admits definable Skolem func-
tions, and so every model of ZFC+V = HOD elementarily embeds the
definable hull of the empty set in that model. 
More generally, if M is any model of ZF, then the collection M0
consisting of the elements of M that are definable without parameters
inM is an elementary substructure of HODM , because it is closed under
the canonical Skolem functions for HODM , which are definable in M .
A similar fact is observed in [Ena05, Theorem 2.11]. The model M0
is therefore prime relative to M , in the sense that whenever M ≡ N ,
then M0 embeds elementarily in HOD
N .
Note that if two pointwise definable models have the same theory,
then they are isomorphic, since the definitions of the elements tell you
the isomorphism. Next, we show that there are also numerous well-
founded pointwise definable models of set theory, if there is a well-
founded model of set theory at all.
Theorem 6. If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there are con-
tinuum many transitive pointwise-definable models of ZFC.
Proof. If there is a transitive model M of ZFC, then there is a transi-
tive model N of ZFC+V = HOD, such as the model LM or any of the
models obtained by forcing V = HOD over M , and such models exist if
M is countable. By observation 5, the collection of parameter-free de-
finable elements of N is a well-founded pointwise-definable elementary
substructure, whose Mostowski collapse is as desired.
To construct continuum many such models, suppose that M is any
countable transitive model of ZFC. Since M is countable, there are a
perfect set of M-generic Cohen reals c, with which we may form the
forcing extension M [c]. By any of the usual methods, such as coding
sets into the GCH pattern (which we will shall explain in greater detail
in section 3), we may form a further forcing extension M [c][G] satisfy-
ing ZFC + V = HOD. The M [c]-generic filter G is built in a diagonal
construction meeting the countably many dense classes of M [c]. By
ensuring that c is the first set to be coded into the GCH pattern—we
could arrange that the GCH holds in M [G] at ℵn exactly when the
nth digit of c is 1—we may assume that c is definable without param-
eters in M [c][G]. Thus, if M0 is the collection of definable elements of
M [c][G], then it is pointwise definable and contains c. Since there are
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continuum many such reals c, we have thereby produced continuum
many transitive pointwise definable models of ZFC. 
A similar observation establishes the following folklore result. The
minimal transitive model of ZFC is Lα for the smallest ordinal α for
which Lα |= ZFC, if any such ordinal exists. If M is any transitive
model of ZFC, then LM |= ZFC and LM = Lα for α = ORD
M , and so
the minimal model exists and is included within M , thereby justifying
its name.
Theorem 7. The minimal transitive model of ZFC is pointwise defin-
able. If Lβ is pointwise definable, then the next βˆ > β with Lβˆ |= ZFC,
if it exists, is also pointwise definable.
Proof. If Lα is the minimal transitive model of ZFC, then by condensa-
tion the definable hull of ∅ in Lα collapses to Lα, and so every element
of Lα is definable in Lα. If Lβ is a pointwise definable model of ZFC
and βˆ is the smallest ordinal above β for which Lβˆ |= ZFC, then β is de-
finable in Lβˆ as the largest ordinal such that Lβ |= ZFC. It follows that
every element of Lβ is definable in Lβˆ , by using a definition relativized
to Lβ , which is definable in Lβˆ . If D is the set of definable elements of
Lβˆ, then the Mostowski collapse of D will have height larger than β,
and be a model of ZFC + V = L, so by the minimality of βˆ it will be
all of Lβˆ . Thus, Lβˆ is pointwise definable, as desired. 
The phenomenon of theorem 7 extends to describable limits of such
Lα. For example, the first Lβ |= ZFC for which β is a limit of α for
which Lα |= ZFC is also pointwise definable, because the definable
hull of Lβ will collapse to such a limit and therefore collapse to Lβ
itself. And similarly for many other limits. But if Lα is an elementary
substructure of Lβ, for α 6= β, then of course Lβ cannot be pointwise
definable, since the definable elements must lie in the range of the em-
bedding. Similarly, if ωL1 ≤ α, then Lα cannot be pointwise definable,
irrespective of whether it satisfies ZFC or not, since this property is
absolute to L and such Lα are uncountable in L.
Theorem 8. There are arbitrarily large ξ < ωL1 for which 〈Lξ,∈〉 is
pointwise definable. If there are arbitrarily large α < ωL1 for which
Lα |= ZFC, then there are arbitrarily large such α for which Lα |= ZFC
and is pointwise definable.
Proof. The second claim is essentially [Ena02, thm 3.7]. For the first
claim, observe that every real of L is definable without parameters
in some countable Lξ, because the L-least real z not definable in any
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countable Lξ, if any should exist, is thereby definable in LωL
1
, which will
condense to a definition of z in some countable Lξ, giving a contradic-
tion. Indeed, by taking the definable hull of the empty set, we find
that z is definable in a pointwise definable Lξ. It follows that such ξ
must be unbounded in ωL1 , establishing the first claim. For the second
claim, suppose that there are unboundedly many α < ωL1 for which
Lα |= ZFC. Observe that every countable ordinal ξ < ω
L
1 is definable
without parameters in Lα |= ZFC, where α is the (ξ + 1)
th ordinal for
which Lα |= ZFC, because this Lα can see exactly ξ many smaller β
for which Lβ |= ZFC, an argument that recalls the definition of Laver
functions for uplifting cardinals in [HJ]. Combining the previous facts,
every real z of L is definable in some Lξ, which is itself definable in
some Lα |= ZFC, and so z is in the definable hull of Lα, which con-
denses to a pointwise definable Lα0 |= ZFC containing z. Since z was
arbitrary in L, these α0 must be unbounded in ω
L
1 , as desired. 
A modelM of ZF is ω-standard if the natural numbers ofM have the
standard order-type ω. More generally, M is ζ-standard for an ordinal
ζ if the ordinals of M have a ζth member, so that the well-founded
initial segment of the ordinals of M has order type exceeding ζ .
Theorem 9. If there are arbitrarily large α < ωL1 for which Lα |= ZFC,
then every real in V is an element of a pointwise definable ω-standard
model of ZFC + V = L, whose well-founded initial segment can be as
large in the countable ordinals of V as desired.
Proof. The argument of theorem 8 shows under the hypothesis that
the conclusion is true in L. We complete the proof of the theorem
by observing that the statement that every real of V is in a pointwise
definable ω-standard model of ZFC + V = L has complexity Π12, since
it has the form “for every real, there is a countable structure...,” where
the omitted portion is arithmetic, since it involves quantification only
over the elements of the structure and the digits of the real. Thus,
by Shoenfield absoluteness this statement is absolute from L to V and
hence is true in V , as desired, even if V has many more reals and larger
countable ordinals than L. Note that if an ω-standard model M has
a real z coding a countable ordinal ζ , then M will decode this real
correctly, and so M will be well-founded beyond ζ , and the theorem is
proved. 
Corollary 10. If there are arbitrarily large α < ωL1 with Lα |= ZFC,
then every countable transitive set M is a countable transitive set inside
a structure M+ that is a pointwise definable model of ZFC + V = L,
and M+ is well-founded beyond the rank of M .
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Proof. Code M by a real z, and place z inside a pointwise definable
ω-standard model M+ |= ZFC + V = L. Since M+ performs the
Mostowski collapse of the structure coded by z correctly, it follows
that M is a transitive set in M+. (In this sense, M end-extends to
M+.) In particular, M+ is well-founded beyond the rank of M . 
Let us notice a few things about these arguments. First, although
in L we produced fully well-founded pointwise definable models, if in
theorem 9 we were to have made that part of the statement, then
the complexity would have risen to Π13 and we would have lost the
absoluteness that allowed us to bring the statement from L to V . And
clearly, we cannot expect to place non-constructible reals inside well-
founded models of V = L. Second, the hypothesis that there are
arbitrarily large α < ωL1 with Lα |= ZFC follows from the simpler
(but strictly stronger) hypothesis that there is a single uncountable
transitive model of ZFC, because one may consider increasingly large
countable elementary substructures of the L of such a model. We may
omit these hypotheses completely in the theorems above, if it is desired
only to have ω-standard pointwise definable models of ZFC∗ + V = L,
where ZFC∗ is some finite fragment of ZFC, rather than full ZFC, since
by reflection and condensation there are arbitrarily large countable Lα
satisfying any such finite fragment ZFC∗.
The results become rather curious when there are reals in V that
are not in L. Suppose there are sufficient Lα |= ZFC and we force
to collapse ω1, with the resulting forcing extension V [g], where g is a
real coding ωV1 . By the argument above, there is in V [g] a countable
ω-standard model M |= ZFC+V = L in which g exists and is actually
definable. Since M has the standard ω, it interprets g correctly and
so the well-founded part of M exceeds ωV1 . But since M |= V = L, it
thinks that g is constructible as well as definable, constructed at some
(nonstandard) ordinal stage α˜ > ωV1 ≥ ω
L
1 !
Another interesting example arises when 0♯ exists. This assumption
implies the hypothesis of the theorem, and so by the theorem there is
a pointwise definable model M of ZFC + V = L, well-founded as high
in the countable ordinals as desired, in which the true 0♯ is a member,
thought byM to be constructible at some stage α˜, necessarily in the ill-
founded part ofM . Thus, the true 0♯ exists unrecognized but definable
in a model of ZFC + V = L that is well-founded far beyond the true
ωL1 ! For example, the modelM can be well-founded beyond a rich class
of (countable) Silver indiscernibles (or even beyond ωV1 if one forces to
collapse as in the previous paragraph) and have the same theory as the
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true LV . The true ordinal indiscernibles of V become discernible in M ,
however, since it is pointwise definable.
Corollary 10 may seem paradoxical when applied to a countable tran-
sitive model M having enormous large cardinals incompatible with L.
For example, perhaps M has supercompact cardinals inside it or has
measures that are iterable in V , meaning all iterates are well-founded;
they cannot be iterable in M+, since this is a model of V = L. In
any case, corollary 10 already implies that every countable model of
ZFC or GBC admits an end-extension to a pointwise definable model
of set theory. In theorems 11 and 13, however, we shall find pointwise
definable extensions with the same ordinals.
Let us now turn to the question of the extent to which definability is
first-order expressible, by making a number of observations that illus-
trate the range of possibility. We have already noted that the property
of a model being pointwise definable is not first-order expressible, since
it is not preserved by nontrivial elementary extensions. Since point-
wise definability is a strong generalization of the axiom V = HOD,
it is tempting to introduce such notation as V = D or V = HD to
express that a model is pointwise definable, thereby maintaining a par-
allel to the classical V = HOD notation while emphasizing that the
definitions need no parameters. We hesitate to adopt this notation,
however, because we fear it would incorrectly suggest that the concept
is first-order expressible, which isn’t the case.
(i) There is no uniform definition of the class of definable elements.
Specifically, there is no formula df(x) in the language of set theory that
is satisfied in any model M |= ZFC exactly by the definable elements.
The reason is that if M0 is pointwise definable and M0 ≺ M is a
nontrivial elementary extension, then the definable elements ofM0 and
M are precisely the elements of M0, and so M0 should satisfy ∀x df(x)
but M would satisfy ∃x¬ df(x), contrary to M0 ≺M .
(ii) In some models of set theory, the class of definable elements is
a definable class. Although there is no uniform definition of the class
of definable elements, it can sometimes happen that a model enjoys a
certain structure that allows it to see its collection of definable elements
as a definable class. For example, in a pointwise definable model, the
class of definable elements includes every object and is therefore defined
by the formula x = x. See also (iv) and (v) below.
(iii) In other models, the collection of definable elements is not a
class. Consider any pointwise definable model M |= ZFC, and let N
be an ultrapower of M by a nonprincipal ultrafilter. The parameter-
free definable elements of N are exactly the elements in the range of the
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embedding. If this collection were a class inN thenN could reconstruct
M and realize itself as an ultrapower, which is impossible.
(iv) In some models, the definable elements form a definable class,
but there is no class function r 7→ ψr mapping definable elements to
definitions of them. Suppose that M is a pointwise definable model of
ZFC. The definable elements of M are all of M , which is certainly a
definable class inM . ButM cannot have a function r 7→ ψr associating
to each element r of M , or even to each real of M , a defining formula
ψr of r, since such a map would reveal to M that it has only countably
many objects.
(v) In other models, the definable elements are a set and there is a
set definability map r 7→ ψr. Suppose that κ is an inaccessible cardinal
(this hypothesis can be reduced), and observe by a Lowenheim-Skolem
argument that there are numerous γ < κ with Vγ ≺ Vκ |= ZFC. It
follows that the definable elements of Vκ are all in Vγ and satisfy the
same definitions there as in Vκ. Since Vγ is a set in Vκ, we may construct
in Vκ the function r 7→ ψr that maps every definable element r of Vγ to
the smallest definition ψr of it, and because Vγ ≺ Vκ, this function has
the same property with respect to Vκ, as desired. The large cardinal
hypothesis can be reduced; it is sufficient to have an ω-model M with
some M0 ∈M having M0 ≺M .
(vi) No model can have a definable definability map r 7→ ψr. If such
a map were definable, then since there are only countably many defini-
tions ψr, we could easily diagonalize against it to produce a definable
real not in the domain of the map. In (v), the map is definable from
parameter γ.
The surviving content of the math-tea argument seems to be the
observation that in any model with access to a definability map r 7→ ψr,
the definable reals do not exhaust all the reals.
3. Pointwise definable forcing extensions
Let us now move beyond the elementary methods and results of sec-
tion 2, and prove that every countable model M of ZFC has a carefully
chosen class forcing extension M [G] that is pointwise definable, so that
all objects of M , as well as those in M [G], become definable in M [G]
without parameters. The forcing is sufficiently adaptable so as to pre-
serve all the usual large cardinal axioms.
Theorem 11. Every countable model of ZFC has a pointwise definable
class forcing extension.
After proving this theorem (on a New York City subway platform),
we came later to learn of earlier work achieving it. The introduction of
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[Dav82], for example, claims the result in the special case of countable
transitive models as a corollary to its main theorem, but the article
unfortunately provides little further explanation.2 Also, Ali Enayat in
remark 2.8.1 of [Ena05] briefly suggests a proof method very similar
to our proof of theorem 11, although he does not state the result as a
formal theorem. Most of Enayat’s excellent paper is concerned with the
Paris models, models of ZF in which every ordinal is definable without
parameters, but in several instances he achieves this by establishing
pointwise definability. One of his main results is [Ena05, theorem 2.19],
which asserts that if there is an uncountable transitive model of ZFC,
then for every infinite cardinal κ, there is a Paris model of ZF having
size κ. These are very large models, but have only countably many
ordinals, since each ordinal is definable without parameters.
Our proof of theorem 11 is based on a technique of Simpson [Sim74],
an early application of forcing to the study of models of arithmetic.
Namely, Simpson proved that every countable model M of PA or ZFC
has an amenable class U (i.e. for any x ∈ M , x ∩ U ∈ M) with the
property that every element of the expanded structure 〈M,U〉 is defin-
able without parameters. Simpson uses forcing to define a new generic
proper class U which codes every element of the universe. The original
structure is expanded by adding a predicate for this new class, produc-
ing a pointwise definable model in the larger language. Our strategy
will be simply to follow this expansion by further forcing that codes U
and the new generic filter into the first-order structure of the model,
thereby eliminating the need for the additional predicate U and pro-
ducing a pointwise definable model in the original pure language of set
theory. In other words, we will show that every countable model of
ZFC can be extended to a pointwise definable model of ZFC, a model
in which every set is definable without parameters.
We begin with a brief review of Simpson’s [Sim74] result. Although
his main result concerned models of PA, he concludes his paper with
a ZFC version of the theorem, and the proof given below is a straight-
forward adaptation of his argument to the ZFC context.
2The main theorem of [Dav82], using Jensen coding, is that every transitive
model of set theory has a class forcing extension in which V = L(r) for a real r,
such that Lα(r) 6|= ZF for every ordinal α. Since this situation is captured by a
first-order theory which can hold in uncountable models, however, it cannot by itself
imply pointwise definability; David apparently had in mind an appeal to further
details of the proof. We note that in comparison to Jensen coding, our forcing is
mild: it is progressively closed and can be made to preserve any of the usual large
cardinals.
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Theorem 12 (Simpson). Let 〈M,∈〉 be a countable model of ZFC.
Then, there is a class U ⊆M such that:
(i) 〈M,∈, U〉 satisfies ZFC in the language with a predicate for U .
(ii) Every element of M is first-order definable in 〈M,∈, U〉.
Proof. Let us begin by enumerating the countable structure M =
{ an | n < ω }. Using the axiom of choice in M , it easy to see that
every set an ∈ M is coded in M by a binary sequence, say a¯n ∈ 2
α,
for some ordinal α ∈ M . Indeed, we can arrange things in such a
way so that all of the relevant coding is done only on the even dig-
its of a¯n, while all odd digits are 0, except that the sequence a¯n ends
with two consecutive 1’s immediately following a limit ordinal. These
restrictions on codes will be useful when we concatenate many such
sequences.
Consider the class forcing in M to add a Cohen class of ordinals,
that is, the partial order Q = 2<ORD consisting of all ordinal length
binary sequences, ordered by extension. Since M is countable, we may
enumerate the dense subclasses 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of Q that are definable
in M from parameters. Let us suppose Dn is defined by the formula
ϕn(x), using parameters from M , and by padding if necessary, we may
assume that the parameters used in ϕn are among {aj | j < n}.
We now construct a certain M-generic filter for Q that will meet all
the dense sets Dn while simultaneously coding all the elements an ofM .
Specifically, we recursively define a descending sequence of conditions
〈pn | n < ω〉 in Q, beginning with p0 = ∅. At odd stages, let p2n+1 be a
minimal-length extension of p2n such that p2n+1 ∈ Dn. At even stages,
let p2n+2 = p2n+1
a a¯n, the sequence obtained by concatenating the code
a¯n to the end of p2n+1. Finally, let U =
⋃
n∈ω pn. This is the union of
the filter consisting of the initial segments of U , which by construction
is M-generic for Q, since we met each dense class Dn. The forcing Q
is κ-closed for every κ in M , and so it follows by standard class-forcing
arguments that we retain ZFC in the language with U in the structure
〈M,∈, U〉.
A straightforward inductive argument now shows that every an and
pn is definable in this structure 〈M,∈, U〉. To see this, suppose that
p2n and aj for j < n have already been defined. Then, p2n+1 is simply
defined as the least initial segment q of U extending p2n such that
M |= ϕn(q). Notice that ϕn uses only parameters from aj for j < n,
which have already been defined, so this definition can be carried out
without the use of any parameters. Now, we define p2n+2 as the least
initial segment q of U , extending p2n+1, that ends in two consecutive 1’s
following a limit ordinal. Given p2n+1 and p2n+2, it is a trivial matter
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to define a¯n, and an is easily defined as the unique set coded by a¯n. In
this fashion, every element of the universe M can be given a first-order
parameter-free definition in the structure 〈M,∈, U〉. 
In the proof of theorem 12, we took care in the selection of U that the
augmented structure 〈M,∈, U〉 would be pointwise definable. Let us
briefly argue that such extra care is indeed required in general, for not
every generic filter U ⊆ 2<ORD over a countable structure M need give
rise to a pointwise definable structure 〈M,∈, U〉. One easy way to see
this is simply to let 〈N,∈∗, U∗〉 be an internal ultrapower of 〈M,∈, U〉
by a nonprincipal ultrafilter on ωM . Since the definable elements must
be in the range of this map, it follows that 〈N,∈∗, U∗〉 is not pointwise
definable. But by elementarity, U∗ is N -generic for the forcing 2<ORD
in N . Alternatively, one may construct transitive counterexamples by
starting with an uncountable 〈M,∈〉 |= ZFC, whose generic expan-
sions 〈M,∈, U〉, obtained by forcing over V , remain uncountable and
therefore not pointwise definable, but further forcing over V can make
them countable, while preserving the M-genericity of U . So extra care
is indeed required. In general, of course, if one starts with a point-
wise definable structure M , then any expansion 〈M,∈, U〉 of it will
remain pointwise definable, and indeed, for this one only needs that M
is a Paris model (where every ordinal is definable without parameters),
since generically U will list every set of ordinals of M and we will be
able to define the beginning and ending points in U of a code for any
desired set.
We now use Simpson’s result to prove theorem 11, where the point-
wise definable structure is not obtained in an expansion of the original
model M , by adding extra predicates to the language, but rather in an
extension of M , obtained by forcing. Thus, we enlarge M to a struc-
tureM [G] in which every object is definable without parameters in the
pure language of set theory.
Proof of theorem 11. Let 〈M,∈〉 be a countable model of ZFC. By forc-
ing over M if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that
〈M,∈〉 |= GCH. By theorem 12, there is an amenable class U ⊆M so
that every element a ∈ M is first-order definable without parameters
in 〈M,∈, U〉, which satisfies ZFC in the language with U . We now rid
ourselves of the extra class U by forcing to code it into the structure
of the universe. Specifically, consider in M the definable sequence of
uncountable regular cardinals δα = ℵω·α+1, conveniently separated by
large gaps that will avoid interference, and let P = Πα∈U Add(δα, δ
++
α )
be Easton’s forcing, which forces failures of the GCH precisely at the
cardinals δα for α ∈ U . If G ⊆ P is M-generic, then it is well known
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that M [G] |= ZFC and all cardinals and cofinalities are preserved. It
follows that the map α 7→ δα is definable inM [G], and so U is definable
in M [G] by the equivalence α ∈ U if and only if 2δα > δ+α .
We shall now perform further forcing to ensure V = HOD in a fur-
ther extensionM [G][H ], by coding into the GCH pattern at the regular
cardinals γα = ℵω·α+5, which sit conveniently in the gaps of the δα se-
quence, again avoiding interference. Specifically, let R be the Easton
support class-length forcing iteration, which at stage α generically de-
cides either to force with trivial forcing, which will preserve the GCH
at γα, or with Add(γα, γ
++
α ), which will violate the GCH at γα. That
is, the stage α forcing is the lottery sum {1¯l} ⊕ Add(γα, γ
++
α ), which
is the disjoint union of these partial orders joined by a new common
upper bound 1l, so that any generic filter picks exactly one factor and
forces with it. Since the forcing at stage α is <γα-closed, we may nicely
factor the iteration R at arbitrarily large cardinals as set forcing fol-
lowed by highly closed tail forcing, and so in the terminology of [Rei06]
it is progressively closed and therefore preserves ZFC. Note also that R
preserves all cardinals and cofinalities over M [G]. To see that R forces
V = HOD, we observe simply that every set of ordinals will eventually
be coded into the GCH pattern on the coding points γα, because we can
extend any condition to a stronger condition that opts for the trivial or
nontrivial side of the forcing in the correct pattern so as to code that
set on an interval. Another way to say it is that the necessary book-
keeping is performed generically by a density argument. Specifically,
suppose that p ∈ R and τ is a R-name such that p  τ ⊆ γˇ for some
ordinal γ. Let β be large enough so that it is beyond the support of p,
beyond γ and also large enough so that τ is a Rβ-name. Extend p to
a stronger condition q, which for ξ < γ opts for trivial forcing at stage
β+ξ with the same Boolean value as [[ ξˇ ∈ τ ]] and for nontrivial forcing
at stage β+ξ with the Boolean value of [[ ξˇ /∈ τ ]]. That is, q(β+ξ) is an
Rβ+ξ-name for the condition that chooses one way or the other in the
lottery sum at that stage, depending on whether ξ ∈ τHβ , where Hβ is
the generic filter up to stage β. The condition q therefore forces that
the set named by τ , whatever it is, will be coded into the GCH pattern
of the γβ+ξ for ξ < γ. Thus, if H ⊆ R is M-generic, every set of ordi-
nals in M [G][H ] will be ordinal-definable, and since every set can be
easily coded by a set of ordinals, it follows that M [G][H ] |= V = HOD.
Let us now complete the argument. Since cardinals were preserved,
it follows that the map α 7→ δα is definable in M [G][H ]. Since the R
forcing only affects the GCH pattern at the γα, it does not upset the
coding we did inM [G] at the δα, and so the class U remains definable in
POINTWISE DEFINABLE MODELS OF SET THEORY 15
M [G][H ] as the class of α for which the GCH fails at δα. Note that the
class M is definable from U in M [G][H ] as the class of sets coded by a
subsequence of U . Since 〈M,∈, U〉 is pointwise definable, it now follows
that every element of M is definable in M [G][H ] without parameters.
In particular, every ordinal is definable inM [G][H ] without parameters.
SinceM [G][H ] is a model of V = HOD, this implies that every element
of M [G][H ] is definable without parameters. 
One can easily combine the two steps of forcing in the proof of theo-
rem 11 by interleaving them into one forcing iteration, which codes U
into the continuum pattern at δα and holds lotteries at γα, leading in
the same way to a forcing extension satisfying V = HOD in which U is
definable. We chose for clarity to separate the coding into two steps.
The argument can be easily modified to use other coding methods.
For example, by using the ♦∗ coding method as in [BT09] one may also
achieve GCH in the final pointwise definable model.
Note also that the forcing of theorem 11 is very mild from the large
cardinal perspective, for we first add a Cohen generic class of ordinals,
and then code it into the GCH pattern while also forcing V = HOD.
These iterations are extremely nice, progressively closed Easton sup-
port iterations and can be made to have increasingly large gaps where
no forcing occurs. Thus, they can easily be made to preserve any of the
usual large cardinal notions. One may therefore find pointwise defin-
able forcing extensions while preserving one’s favorite large cardinals.
For example, ifM has a supercompact cardinal κ, one should first make
κ Laver-indestructible, and then do all the coding above κ, which will
preserve the supercompactness of κ since it is <κ-directed closed.
4. Extending the result from ZFC to GBC
For the main contribution of this article, we should like now to ex-
tend the result from ZFC to Go¨del-Bernays GBC set theory, which is
a natural context for pointwise definability since it allows for a precise
formal treatment of classes in set theory and many of the pointwise
definability arguments have involved augmenting a model of set theory
with additional proper classes, such as those arising with class forcing.
We refer the reader to [Jec03] or [Men97, p. 225–86] for an overview
of Go¨del-Bernays set theory. Here, we regard a GBC model of set the-
ory as a triple M = 〈M,S,∈〉, consisting of a model 〈M,∈〉 of ZFC
augmented with a family S ⊆ P (M), whose members are the classes
of M, satisfying the GBC axioms. The GBC axioms extend the ZFC
axioms to this two-sorted second-order context by allowing formulas in
the replacement and separation axioms to make use of finitely many
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class parameters (but not to quantify over classes, a strengthening that
constitutes Kelly-Morse set theory). In particular, if ~X is any finite list
of classes from S, then the expansion 〈M,∈, ~X〉, obtained by interpret-
ing the classes in ~X as predicates overM , satisfies ZFC( ~X), the version
of ZFC in which the classes of ~X may appear as atomic predicates in
the replacement and separation axioms schemes, and furthermore, any
class definable in 〈M,∈, ~X〉 must be in S. In addition, GBC includes
a global version of the axiom of choice, meaning that there is a single
class choice function F ∈ S such that F (x) ∈ x for every nonempty set
x.
Although the GBC axioms admit an elegant and economical formu-
lation purely in terms of classes, as every model of GBC is determined
entirely by its collection of classes, we prefer the two-sorted set-class
formulation here so as to emphasize the connection with models of
ZFC. In particular, any model 〈M,∈〉 of ZFC can be extended to a
model 〈M,S,∈〉 of GBC by first finding an M-generic filter G ⊆ Q
for the class forcing Q = M<ORD to add a global well-ordering of the
universe—a forcing notion that is κ-closed for every cardinal κ and
hence adds no sets—and then letting S consist of the classes defin-
able in 〈M,∈, G〉 from parameters; the forcing to add G ensures global
choice in 〈M,S,∈〉, and is unnecessary if 〈M,∈〉 already has a global
choice class function. It follows that GBC is conservative over ZFC
in the sense that any statement purely about sets that is provable in
GBC is also provable in ZFC.
The method of forcing works over models of GBC just as it does
over models of ZFC. In particular, if P is a partial order in a model
M = 〈M,S,∈〉 of GBC and G ⊆ P is M-generic, then we may define
M[G] = 〈M [G], S[G],∈〉, where M [G] and S[G] consist of interpreting
in the usual way via G the sets and classes that are P-names in M.
In the case of set forcing, where P ∈ M , the analogues of the basic
ZFC forcing lemmas hold also for GBC, and in this case the forcing
extension M[G] continues to satisfy GBC. Class forcing, in contrast,
can destroy GBC just as it can destroy ZFC, such as by making every
set countable, to give one badly behaved example. Nevertheless, there
are large families of nicely behaved class-forcing notions that necessarily
preserve GBC. This includes progressively closed forcing in the sense of
[Rei06], that is, forcing notions that factor for arbitrarily large cardinals
κ as P0 ∗ Ptail, where P0 is a set and Ptail is <κ-closed. As it happens,
all of the forcing notions necessary to carry out the constructions in
this article are progressively closed, and so the corresponding forcing
extensions will all satisfy GBC.
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The main theorem of this section is that every countable model of
Go¨del-Bernays set theory can be extended to a pointwise definable
model.
Theorem 13. Every countable model of Go¨del-Bernays set theory has
a pointwise definable extension, where every set and class is first-order
definable without parameters.
Thus, the original countable GBC model 〈M,S,∈〉 is extended to a
pointwise-definable ZFC model 〈M [G],∈〉, such that every set in M [G]
and every class in S is definable in 〈M [G],∈〉 without parameters.
In order to prove this theorem, we shall first prove a special case
of it, the case where the original model 〈M,S,∈〉 is principal, mean-
ing that there is a class X ∈ S such that every class in S is first-
order definable in 〈M,∈, X〉 with set parameters. The principal models
of GBC include many natural instances. For example, earlier we ex-
plained that any model of ZFC can be transformed into a GBC model
with the same sets, by first forcing global choice and then augmenting
with the classes definable from that generic well-ordering; the result-
ing GBC model is principal by construction. Furthermore, the collec-
tion of principal models of GBC is closed under forcing, even proper
class forcing (provided GBC itself is preserved), since one can amal-
gamate the original generating class with the newly generic class to
form a new generating class. So we have plenty of principal models of
GBC. Nevertheless, it is also easy to construct non-principal models,
such as the weak limit of a suitable iteration of ω many extensions
M ⊆ M [G0] ⊆ M [G0][G1] ⊆ · · · , whose union satisfies GBC but is
nonprincipal. Additional non-principal models are provided by the
fact that no model 〈M,S,∈〉 of Kelly-Morse set theory can be prin-
cipal as a GBC model, since KM proves that every class X admits a
first-order truth class for 〈M,∈, X〉, since for each n the Σ
∼n
(X) truth
class is unique satisfying the recursive definition of truth and these
classes can be unified into one class in KM, but no such truth class can
be first-order definable from X over M . An instance of this arises from
an inaccessible cardinal κ with the structure 〈Vκ, Vκ+1,∈〉, which is a
model of GBC and in fact KM, but is easily seen not to be principal
as a GBC model on cardinality grounds, since it has 2κ many classes
but only κ many sets and hence only κ many classes definable from
any fixed class. Nevertheless, this model can be made principal by the
forcing to collapse 2κ to κ, which adds no sets to Vκ, but which adds a
generic κ-enumeration of the ground model subsets of Vκ.
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Theorem 14. Every countable principal GBC model has a class forcing
extension that is pointwise definable, in which every set and class is
first-order definable without parameters.
Proof. Suppose that M = 〈M,S,∈〉 is a principal countable model
of GBC. To prove the theorem we must show there is a class forcing
extension 〈M [G],∈〉, satisfying ZFC such that every set in M [G] and
every class in S is definable in 〈M [G],∈〉 without parameters. The
proof will follow the proof of theorem 11, extending the argument to
handle the issues arising on account of the second-order part of the
models. Since M is principal, there is a class X ∈ S such that every
class in S is first-order definable in the structure 〈M,∈, X〉. By forcing
if necessary, we may assume M |= GCH.
The first step is to prove the analogue of Simpson’s theorem for this
case. Specifically, we claim that there is an amenable class U such
that 〈M,∈, U〉 satisfies ZFC(U) and every set and class in 〈M,S,∈〉
is definable in 〈M,∈, U〉 without parameters. The proof is just as
in theorem 12, with an extra step. Enumerate M = 〈an | n < ω〉
and choose codes a˜n ∈ 2
<ORD for each an. Let Q = 2
<ORD and con-
struct an M-generic class U0 ⊂ Q as in the proof of theorem 12 so
that every set in M is definable without parameters in 〈M,∈, U0〉.
Since the forcing is κ-closed for every cardinal κ, it adds no sets and
M[U0] = 〈M,S[U0],∈〉 |= GBC, where S[U0] is the collection of classes
obtained by interpreting via U0 the Q-names in M. Let U be the class
X⊕U0, combining the two classes in some canonical manner as a class
of ordinals, and observe that 〈M,∈, U〉 satisfies ZFC(U), because the
forcing Q is progressively closed – indeed, it is κ-closed for every cardi-
nal κ. Since U0 is definable from U in 〈M,∈, U〉, it follows that every
element of M is definable in 〈M,∈, U〉 without parameters. And since
X is also definable from U there, and every class in S is definable from
X with set parameters, it follows that every class in S is also definable
in 〈M,∈, U〉 without parameters, as desired.
As in theorem 11, we may now force to code the digits of U into
the GCH pattern at the cardinals δα = ℵω·α+1, producing a forcing
extension M [G] in which U is definable without parameters. It follows
that M is also definable there, since the sets in M are exactly the sets
that are coded into a block of U0. Next, a further forcing extension
M [G][H ] satisfies V = HOD by generically coding the GCH pattern at
the cardinals γα = ℵω·α+5 as before. Thus, every element of M [G][H ]
is definable from ordinal parameters, but these are definable without
parameters since every element of M , including every ordinal, is defin-
able from M and U0, which are definable from U , which is definable
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without parameters in 〈M [G][H ],∈〉. It follows that every class in S
is definable without parameters in 〈M [G][H ],∈〉, since X is definable
from U there, and U is definable without parameters. So every set and
class in 〈M [G][H ],∈〉 is definable without parameters, as desired. 
To complete the proof of theorem 13, it suffices to show that every
countable GBC model M can be extended to a principal GBC model.
Our initial attempts to prove this involved meta-class forcing. We
wanted to replicate the situation of the model 〈Vκ, Vκ+1,∈〉 in the case
κ is an inaccessible cardinal, since this structure is non-principal, but is
made principle in the forcing extension V [G], where G ⊆ Coll(κ, Vκ+1),
which collapses 2κ to κ. The generic filter G can be viewed as a subclass
of κ× Vκ, whose columns are exactly the ground model subsets of Vκ,
which are exactly the classes of the original model. In this way, the
old classes are unified into one new generic class. The forcing in this
argument is meta-class forcing, as opposed to merely class forcing, since
the individual conditions are classes in 〈Vκ, Vκ+1,∈〉.
A similar idea appears to work over any model of Kelly-Morse set
theory, although the details of verifying the meta-class forcing technol-
ogy are abundant. The idea is that given a model 〈M,S,∈〉 |= KM,
one considers the meta-class of conditions consisting of an ordinal α
and a subclass A ⊆ α×M , with A ∈ S. Stronger conditions enlarge α
and specify additional columns, and so the forcing is exactly analogous
to Coll(ORDM , S) as above. In this way, it is dense to add any class of
S onto a vertical slice, and the generic class G ⊆ ORD×M will unify
all the classes X ∈ S into one class, making a principal model.
Such a meta-class forcing method, however, does not seem to work
easily over GBC models, and one should not expect to add a single
generic class from which all the classes of S are uniformly definable, by
varying only set parameters.
Nevertheless, we avoid the difficulties of these higher-order forcing
arguments and complete the proof of theorem 13 by appealing to the
following remarkable observation of Sy Friedman (sketched in an email
correspondence with the first author), which shows that every count-
able GBC model does indeed have a principal extension with the same
sets. Kossak and Schmerl prove a similar fact about models of PA in
[KS06, Theorem 6.5.6], showing that for any model 〈M,R0, R1, . . .〉 |=
PA∗ there is a G ⊆ M such that 〈M,G〉 |= PA∗ and each Ri is definable
in 〈M,G〉. It is the Kossak/Schmerl proof method that we shall adapt
to GBC models here. Viewing the original Kossak/Schmerl theorem as
one about models of GBC¬∞, the theory GBC with the infinity axiom
replaced by its negation (and augmented with the assertion that every
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set has a transitive closure), Ali Enayat has described theorem 15 here
as one of the positive instances where a model-theoretic theorem about
GBC¬∞ extends to GBC; not all of them do.
Theorem 15 (Friedman/Kossak/Schmerl). Every countable model M
of GBC can be extended to a principal model M[Y ] |= GBC while
adding no sets, only classes. Indeed, in the extension, every set and
class in M is definable in the structure 〈M,∈, Y 〉.
Proof. For clarity, let us mention up-front that the extension M[Y ]
we produce will not necessarily be a class forcing extension of M,
although it will satisfy GBC because of the close connections it has with
a sequence of increasingly partially generic extensions. Specifically, for
each n we will be able to realize M[Y ] as a Σn-generic extension of M
by a partial order Qn, meaning that all Σ∼n definable dense subclasses
of Qn are met by the filter, and by increasing n this suffices to capture
the whole of GBC.
Suppose thatM = 〈M,S,∈〉 is a countable model of GBC, meaning
that it has countably many sets and classes. Enumerate the classes of
ordinals in S as 〈An | n < ω〉, so that An ⊆ ORD
M and every class
in S is first-order definable from some An. We shall add a class Y of
ordinals in such a way that 〈M,∈, Y 〉 satisfies ZFC(Y ) and every An is
coded into Y , hidden away by coding on increasingly difficult-to-define
subclasses of ordinals. Specifically, we will construct a sequence of trees
Q0 ⊃ Q1 ⊃ Q2 ⊃ · · · , each definable but with increasingly complex
definitions. The class Y will give a branch through
⋂
Qn, and An will
be determined by the choices that Y makes within Qn. Thus An will
be recoverable from Y and Qn, but the increasing complexity of Qn
suggests that we should not expect a uniform definition.
If we succeed, then it follows by induction that every An and hence
every class in S, is definable in 〈M,∈, Y 〉, whose definable classes form
a principal GBC model, and so we will have proved the theorem.
The argument will rely on some refinements of the customary gen-
eral facts about class forcing, which we shall summarize here but not
prove. First, for any sufficiently nice3 class forcing notion P, the forcing
relation p P ϕ is definable inM from P; the refinement we need is that
for ϕ of bounded complexity Σn, the forcing relation has some bounded
complexity Σk(P) in M . Second, whenever p P ϕ, then M [G] |= ϕ
for any M-generic filter G ⊆ P containing p; the refinement we need
3The question of whether every class forcing notion has a definable forcing rela-
tion (i.e. ‘is sufficiently nice’) is open. However, a sufficient condition which holds
of a great many class forcings, including all those appearing in this paper, is that
every subset A ⊂ P is contained in a complete subposet Q ⊂C P
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is that for ϕ of bounded complexity Σn, there is some k such that
M [G] |= ϕ for any Σk(P)-generic filter G ⊆ P containing p. Third,
whenever M [G] |= ϕ for some M-generic filter G ⊆ P, then there is
a condition p ∈ G such that p P ϕ; the refinement we need is that
for ϕ of bounded complexity Σn, there is some k such that whenever
M [G] |= ϕ for some Σk(P)-generic filter G ⊆ P, then p P ϕ for some
p ∈ G. These refinements simply assert that the forcing mechanics
are sound with respect to partially but sufficiently generic filters, and
can be proved by induction by following the usual proofs of the forcing
lemmas and paying attention to the complexity of the dense sets that
arise in the arguments. It is not relevant for our application to find the
strictly optimal relations between n and k, although one could do this.
Now, let us return to the argument and create the generic coding
class Y . Let Q0 = Add(ORD, 1) = 2
<ORD be the class of all binary
ordinal length sequences, ordered by extension. We will construct a
descending sequence of class forcing notions
Q0 ⊃ Q1 ⊃ Q2 ⊃ · · ·
Each Qn will be a perfect tree, that is, a subclass of 2
<ORD that is
splitting (any node can be extended to two incompatible nodes, though
not necessarily at the next level) and contains full limits. There is a
canonical embedding of 2<ORD into any perfect tree, whose image is
exactly the splitting nodes (nodes with two immediate successors) of
the tree. This embedding is dense, and therefore witnesses the forcing
equivalence of Add(ORD, 1) and any perfect tree. Thus, all the Qn
are individually forcing equivalent to Add(ORD, 1), which is κ-closed
for every cardinal κ and therefore adds no new sets, while forcing ZFC
relative to the generic class.
Given Qn, we construct Qn+1 in two stages. First, we will refine
Qn to a subtree with the property that any branch will meet all Σ∼n
definable dense subclasses of Qn. By increasing the length of the stem,
or portion of the tree below the first branch point, in this stage we
will also guarantee a branch through the intersection. We then further
refine this subtree to obtain Qn+1, ensuring that any branch through
Qn+1 codes An.
The construction proceeds as follows. We fix a sequence of ordinals
〈an | n ∈ ω〉 cofinal in M (these will govern the growth of the stems
of the Qn). Given Qn, we fix an enumeration 〈Dα | α ∈ ORD〉 in
M of all Σ
∼n
(Qn) definable dense subclasses of Qn. We now construct
an embedding f : 2<ORD → Qn. Let f(∅) be the least splitting node
of Qn which has length exceeding an (by ‘least’ we mean the node of
shortest length, and if more than one such node exists we take the least
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according to some fixed class well-ordering of M from S). Given f(p)
where p has length α, and fixing e ∈ {0, 1}, we let f(p a e) be the least
splitting node q of Qn extending f(p)
a e such that q ∈ Dα. For p
of limit length, we take f(p) to be the least splitting node extending⋃
p′⊂p f(p
′) and lying in Dα. Let Q
∗
n denote the subtree of Qn deter-
mined by f , that is, the tree consisting of all predecessors of members
of ran(f). For each α, any branch through Q∗n will necessarily meet
{f(p) | p has length α} ⊂ Dα, and so any branch will meet all Σ∼n
definable dense subclasses of Qn.
We now refine Q∗n to encode An by selecting only those q ∈ Q
∗
n which
“choose according to An on the even splitting nodes.” That is, we select
those q such that, for any predecessor q′ of q, if q′ is a splitting node of
Q∗n with exactly 2 ·α many splitting nodes preceding it, then q
′ a 1 ∈ q
if and only if α ∈ An. Let Qn+1 be the subtree of Q
∗
n determined
by such q, that is, the tree consisting of all predecessors of such q.
Given Qn together with any branch of Qn+1 we can easily recover An
by comparing values of the branch corresponding to the even splitting
nodes of Qn. Conversely, note that Qn+1 was defined from parameters
Qn and An.
This completes the construction. We now take Y =
⋂
Qn. That Y
is nonempty and contains a single branch follows from the fact the Qn
are nested and have stems of increasing length unbounded in ORDM.
The key observation remaining is that the construction ensures that
〈M,∈, Y 〉 satisfies ZFC(Y ). Any axiom of ZFC(Y ) has some logical
complexity Σn in the forcing language, and by the refined forcing facts
mentioned above there is some kn sufficiently large so that the forcing
lemmas concerning Σn work as expected for all Σkn(Qkn) generic filters
of Qkn . By construction Y has the required level of genericity for Qkn ,
and so 〈M,∈, Y 〉 satisfies every axiom of ZFC(Y ), as desired. As we
have observed, each An is definable from Y and Qn. The partial order
Qn+1 is definable from Qn and An, and it follows inductively that each
An and each Qn are definable in 〈M,∈, Y 〉. Thus every class in S is
definable from Y , and so we have produced the desired principal model
〈M,∈, Y 〉 extendingM. In particular, every set and class of this model
is definable using only the parameter Y over M . 
Theorem 13 now follows from theorems 14 and 15, since any count-
able model of GBC can first be made principal by theorem 15 and then
pointwise definable by theorem 14. In fact, the Friedman/Kossak/Schmerl
theorem (theorem 15) can also serve as a replacement for Simpson’s
theorem 12 in the proof of theorem 11, since as we mentioned every set
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and class of M is definable in the structure 〈M,∈, Y 〉, which was the
whole point of theorem 12.
Finally, we remark that the proof we have just given of theorem 13
allows us to preserve any of the usual large cardinals from the ground
model to the pointwise definable extension. This is because the ap-
plication of theorem 15 does not add sets, and so preserves all large
cardinal properties, and the remaining forcing of theorem 14 is the very
nice, progressively closed Easton-support forcing iteration to code the
class Y and then force V = HOD. As we mentioned after theorem
11, this can be easily arranged to accommodate any of the usual large
cardinal notions. Thus, any countable model of GBC with any of the
usual large cardinals has an extension to a pointwise-definable model
of ZFC, in which every set and class is definable without parameters,
and in which those large cardinals are preserved.
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